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MINERAL RIGHTS
Patrick H. Martin*
In the past year and a half the petroleum industry has continued in
its significant downturn. On October 24, 1983, the active rig count in
Louisiana was 274. Natural gas prices have dropped still further from
a year ago so that new sales are generally below three dollars per MMBTU
and often are considerably less than that. Oil prices are stable but lower
than several years ago. The legal problems of the "gas bubble" are
presently before the courts, but few cases have reached the stage of
reported decision. New federal legislation that would alter the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978' is a distinct possibility.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In 1983, the legislature enacted several provisions concerning mineral
rights. Act 203 of 1983 amended article 213 of the Mineral Code to add
a definition of actual mining operations. Several other provisions of the
Mineral Code are affected by this definition, which may be somewhat
broader than originally contemplated by the drafters of those provisions.
Act 409 of 1983 revised Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:12 which pro-
vides for judicial review of rules and orders of the Commissioner of Con-
servation. It broadens the provisions and procedures for review by incor-
porating most of the procedures for judicial review from the Administrative
Procedure Act.2 Act 409 of 1983 provides a sixty-day time limit from
a mailing of a final decision in which to seek review, as opposed to a
thirty-day limit under the Administrative Procedure Act. It also exempts
from the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:963-965 matters for
which review is available under Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:12. These
amendments were made in order to overcome the problems created by
the statutes and the holding in Jordan v. Sutton3 that the Commissioner
of Conservation is subject to two parallel and coexisting forms of judicial
review.'
Act 660 of 1983 amends the Mineral Code by adding article 212.31.
It requires payments for oil and gas production to royalty and working
interest owners in wells or units to be accompanied by a check stub or
other attachment with certain information unless that information is other-
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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wise regularly provided. Among other things, the information must in-
clude lease or well or unit identification; month and year of sales or pur-
chases included in the payment; total quantity of production purchased;
the final realizable price; total taxes (except windfall profit tax); net value
of sales; interest owner's percent interest; interest owner's share of the
total value of the sales prior to tax deduction; and interest owner's share
of the after-tax value.
Acts 643 and 644 of 1983 provide certain severance tax and royalty
exemptions on state leases for approved tertiary recovery projects for crude
oil production.
SUCCESSIONS AND CONVEYANCES
The validity of a testamentary disposition of certain rights in minerals
was an issue in Succession of Goode.' The olographic will in Goode pro-
vided, inter alia, that all "oil & gas royalty interest payments owned by
me shall be paid to Pauline Egbert Parker for as long as she might live.
After her death the amount of any payments shall be equally divided be-
tween my nieces and nephews and Linda Cosby Paine."' Opponents of
the will sought to annul it, claiming that the quoted language constituted
a prohibited substitution under Civil Code article 1520. The trial court
and court of appeal agreed with the opponents. 7 On the appeal of the
beneficiaries, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed. In its initial opinion,
the court upheld the will on the basis that it created a usufruct in Pauline
Parker with naked ownership in the nieces, nephews, and Linda Cosby
Paine. On rehearing, the court again upheld the will, but on the rationale
that it provided for successive usufructs of the mineral royalty payments
with the naked ownership passing intestate.
The decision in Succession of Goode appears quite reasonable. Since
mineral royalties are passive rights, there seems little reason to force them
back into commerce. Likewise, in the absence of ascendants or descen-
dants, there was little reason not to give effect to the testator's desires
for the distribution of his property. The court seemed troubled with
characterizing the right created as a usufruct, since the testator bequeathed
the royalty "payments" rather than the "use" of the payments. The nor-
mal manner of creating usufruct is to use the words "use and benefit"
or "use" of the property because the usufructuary of most sorts of prop-
erty has a duty to preserve and transmit the thing. However, the usufruc-
tuary of a mineral right has no duty to preserve and transmit the benefits
of the right; the usufructuary may retain all payments made under the
right.' Thus the testator left the "payments" and not the "use of the
5. 425 So. 2d 673 (La. 1983).
6. Id. at 675.
7. 395 So. 2d 875 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
8. LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:193-:194 (Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited as LA. MIN.
CODE].
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payments" since "use" would have suggested a duty to account to the
naked owners at the termination of the usufruct.
A testamentary usufruct was also at issue in Succession of Blake.9
The decedent died testate in 1973, leaving the usufruct of her one-twentieth
interest in minerals in 6000 acres of land to her daughter and the naked
ownership in her grandchildren. The naked owners brought suit for
declaratory judgment to determine their rights and those of the usufruc-
tuary. The trial court held that the law at the time of the creation of
the usufruct-pre-Mineral Code-entitled the usufructuary to enjoy all of
the bonus, delay rental, and royalties accruing to that interest, whether
or not an "open mine" was present. The Louisiana First Circuit Court
of Appeal affirmed, but held that article 193 of the Mineral Code simply
codified the pre-existing law allocating all bonus, delay rental, and royalties
to the usufructuary of a mineral right. However, at the time of the crea-
tion of this usufruct in 1973, the usufructuary was under a duty to restore
to the naked owners a thing of the same quality and value or its estimate
price. While this duty was changed in 1975,11 it remains a limit on the
usufruct in Blake.
The degree of finality and certainty in matters of mineral contracts
has been at issue in several reported cases. In Cascio v. Schoenbrodt,"
the plaintiffs signed a purchase agreement for the defendants' land and
mineral rights. At the closing, defendant Schoenbrodt objected to the
language of the act of sale relative to the mineral rights and refused to
go forward with the sale. The plaintiffs brought suit for specific perfor-
mance. The defendants appealed the trial court judgment ordering specific
performance and the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal reversed
on the basis that the language of the purchase agreement was too unclear
to be given effect. The uncertain language was as follows:
Sellers to retain one-half of all mineral rights as long as they are
financing the above property as well as royalty rights. Sellers agree
to grant a partial release of mortgage on any part of the prop-
erty upon receiving a pro-rata payment on the remaining balance
of the mortgage as compared to the amount of property released.' 2
Parol evidence of the intent of the parties established uncertainty as to
essential elements, and the agreement was held to be of no effect.
In Duncan v. Paragon Resources, Inc.,'3 a geologist sought to be
declared the owner of an overriding royalty interest in four leases. The
court of appeal held that parol evidence could not be used to prove his
right to such an interest. Because the interest claimed was a mineral right
9. 428 So. 2d 1118 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
10. LA. MIN. CODE art. 194 (Supp. 1983).
11. 431 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
12. Id. at 34.
13. 417 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
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within the meaning of the Mineral Code and thus a real right, it could
be proved only by a writing.' 4
LEASE RIGHTS AND MAINTENANCE
Last year, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided the first of the
"market value" royalty cases then pending in the state. 5 It has now
decided a second such case, Shell Oil Co. v. Williams, Inc." The plain-
tiffs Shell Oil Co. and Pennzoil Producing Co. sued their lessors for a
declaratory judgment that royalty payments under the leases were con-
trolled by the federally regulated price for which the plaintiffs sold the
gas rather than by the value of the gas sold in the unregulated intrastate
market. Reversing a court of appeal decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held for the plaintiffs, holding that market value must be determined by
reference to sales comparable in quality. Consideration of comparability
must include the legal quality of the gas, i.e., whether it is sold in a
regulated or an unregulated market. The majority opinion did not dwell
on evidence of intent, although it did note that the defendants knew of
plaintiffs' intent to sell into the interstate market. It also observed that
the plaintiffs were under a duty to market the production with diligence
and that the sales were prudently made.
In a well reasoned dissent, Justice Dennis contended that the major-
ity had recognized the interstate market as a separate market, and that
such a maiket did not exist in 1934 when the leases were first obtained.
Thus the parties' intent could not have been as the majority found.'"
In Dawes v. Hale," the second circuit was called upon to interpret
an acreage retention clause in a lease. The clause provided that, in the
event of lease termination for any cause, the lessee would keep an area
of forty acres around each producing well. The lease covered only forty
acres. The lessee had drilled three wells on the property, but evidence
indicated that only one and one-half acres were actually drained by the
wells. The plaintiffs sought lease cancellation for failure to develop the
leasehold as a prudent operator. Relying on the acreage retention clause,
the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal
the second circuit reversed. It was the opinion of the court of appeal
that under article 122 of the Mineral Code, the parties may stipulate what
constitutes reasonable development but they may not contractually abrogate
it entirely. Here, said the court, the acreage retention clause reflected no
14. LA. MIN. CODE arts. 16, 18 (1975). There may yet be problems with characterizing
such an overriding royalty as a real right for other purposes.
15. Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982), discussed in Mar-
tin, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Mineral Rights, 43 LA. L. REV. 523, 530-31 (1982).
16. 428 So. 2d 798 (La. 1983).
17. Id. at 804.
18. 421 So. 2d 1208 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
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clear intent to limit or define the development obligation of the lessee.
Thus, it could not displace the duty to develop reasonably.
In Dawes, the court stated that the "principle of reasonable develop-
ment is a matter of public policy, necessary in order to give effect to
the parties' intent inherent in all mineral leases, to assure reasonable
development of the state's natural resources, and to prevent property be-
ing taken out of commerce."' 9 However, it is doubtful that article 122
embodies any policy other than giving effect to the intent of the parties.
The court must have derived the public policy from another source which
it did not cite. It is questionable whether public policy does favor develop-
ment as spelled out by the court. Conservation regulations limit the number
of wells in an area by unitization and by spacing regulations. The drilling
of numerous shallow wells on small tracts of land, each producing small
amounts of oil or gas, may in fact be wholly undesirable. The increments
of production from such wells may be more than offset by the side ef-
fects of salt water pollution and irresponsible operators who may drill
such wells for investment purposes apart from the desire to produce oil
and gas. There are numerous well holes, mud pits, and brine pits left
behind by operators who drilled and departed without fulfilling their
obligations.
The plaintiffs in Willis v. Franklin0 sued their lessee for damages
and dissolution of the mineral lease for nonpayment of royalty. Although
some persons gave the defendants notice of nonpayment, including writ-
ten notice prior to the notice of the plaintiffs, plaintiff Willis did not
give written notice of default until September 2, 1981. Eight days after
this written notice, the plaintiffs filed suit.
The trial court dismissed the claim on the ground that suit was
premature since the thirty-day waiting period of the Mineral Code had
not run. The court of appeal affirmed this judgment since articles 137-138
of the Mineral Code allow a lessee a thirty-day period to respond to a
demand letter for nonpayment of royalty. Suit filed prior to this time
was thus premature.
The necessity of putting in default for nonpayment of shut-in payments
was at issue in Acquisitions, Inc. v. Frontier Explorations, Inc." A well
on the lease in question was completed as a gas producer in November
1980 and shut in while awaiting connection to an available market. The
lease provided that shut-in payments of one hundred dollars per month
were to be made in such circumstances. Fourteen months of shut-in
royalties were tendered on July 27, 1982; no demand had been made at
this time by the original lessors. These lessors had sold some interests
19. Id. at 1211.
20. 420 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
21. 432 So. 2d 1095 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
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in minerals to the plaintiff Acquisitions, Inc., on June 9, 1982, and Ac-
quistions had demanded release of the lease on July 8, 1982, and filed
suit on July 20, 1982.
The trial court granted summary judgment, deeming the lease ter-
minated for failure to make shut-in payments. The court of appeal
reversed. The court of appeal properly noted that the issue turned on
the lease terms: If the shut-in payments were classified as royalty, then
a putting in default, with a corresponding thirty-day period in which the
lessee may pay, was required by articles 137-138 of the Mineral Code.
If the shut-in payments were classified as shut-in "delay rentals," then
the rentals clause would constitute an express resolutory condition of the
lease, and the lease would terminate automatically.2 2 Here the lease treated
shut-in payments as royalty; therefore, the notices of nonpayment and
delays governed and the lease did not terminate.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The plaintiffs in Hogan Exploration, Inc. v. Placid Oil Co.23 brought
suit for a writ of mandamus against the purchaser of oil from a well
to compel payment for the production. They relied on articles 210-211
of the Mineral Code for availability of the writ. Placid Oil Co. (Placid)
defended on the ground that it owned rights covering the same land and
that the writ of mandamus was not appropriate. Agreeing with Placid
as to mandamus proceedings, the court of appeal reversed a trial court
order of payment to the plaintiffs. The court held that, despite the
language of article 211 of the Mineral Code allowing use of mandamus,
the use of the writ is not appropriate where the law provides relief by
ordinary means. Here the court found that there existed a serious title
dispute that had to be resolved before compelling payment.
Judge Stoker, concurring in Hogan (Judge Yelverton joined Judge
Stoker in concurrence which actually made it the majority opinion)
observes that the opinion written by Judge Knoll would mean that the
writ of mandamus could probably never be used. But, as he notes, some
meaning must be given to the summary proceeding authorized in article
211. He states the law as follows: "[T]he test is not absence of other
forms of relief by ordinary process. Rather, the test is whether there are
no serious issues to be resolved, that is, where the amount due and owing
is certain, definite and fixed." ' This view seems preferable.
At issue in Bordelon v. Crutcher" was the running of prescription
on a claim for reimbursement of overpayment of costs under a farmout.
22. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 123, comment (1975).
23. 427 So. 2d 546 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 So. 2d 1053 (La. 1983).
24. Id. at 550.
25. 430 So. 2d 1107 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
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In earlier litigation, it was held that the plaintiff herein had been entitled
in his contract with defendant to three percent of the defendant's interest
in a certain farmout agreement, not three percent of the entire farmout.26
The plaintiff then brought this action for reimbursement of overpayments
of costs attributable to his interest since he apparently had paid costs
as though he had three percent of the entire farmout. Defendant filed
an exception of prescription of ten years. The court of appeal held that
the prescription exception was properly dismissed because the plaintiff did
not know he had overpaid his costs until the earlier litigation held that
his interest was limited to three percent of the defendant's interest in the
farmout. Prescription could not run until he knew he had overpaid.
PRESCRIPTION OF MINERAL SERVITUDE
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the two lower court decisions
on an issue of interruption of prescription in Cox v. Sanders.27 The court
of appeal had held that the good faith drilling of and production from
two wells under a lease granted by only one of two coowners without
the consent of the nonleasing coowner did not constitute a use of the
servitude which would interrupt liberative prescription. The reasoning of
the court of appeal was that while article 174 of the Mineral Code pro-
vides that the use by one coowner of a servitude inures to the "benefit"
of all coowners, it would not apply in a case such as this where the
coowner of the servitude is the landowner who does not want the "benefit"
of interruption of prescription. 2'
Reversing the lower courts, the supreme court held that the mineral
servitude on the lands in question had not been extinguished by prescrip-
tion. This applies only to the contiguous lands in the case since a land-
owner cannot create a single servitude on two or more noncontiguous
tracts. There is ample precedent for the court's approach, and the deci-
sion will avoid some serious problems that would otherwise arise.',
TORT AND TRESPASS PROBLEMS
In Jumonville v. Frank's Petroleum, Inc.,3" the plaintiff lessor brought
suit for mental anguish at seeing his son injured in a vehicle accident
on the leasehold. The accident involved a contractor of the lessee, and
the jury decided that the contractor was not negligent in the accident.
The plaintiff nevertheless claimed damages under a lease clause making
the lessee responsible for all damages caused by the lessee's permitted
26. Bordelon v. Crutcher, 365 So. 2d 1109 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
27. 421 So. 2d 869 (La. 1982).
28. 409 So. 2d 1257, 1260 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
29. See Martin, supra note 15 at 531-32.
30. 422 So. 2d 1261 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
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operations. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court judgment for the
defendant. The court found the lease clause inapplicable because the plain-
tiff's damages were not caused by the lessee's operations since the lessee's
contractor was not negligent.
Lloyd v. Hunt Exploration, Inc.3" presented a question of trespass.
The landowners had leased to a company, and that company had given
the defendant seismic operator permission to go on the land and under-
take seismic exploration operations. The lease had given the lessee the
exclusive right to go on the land in search of minerals, but the trial court
and court of appeal nonetheless held that a claim for trespass could be
brought. The court stated: "A landowner does not abandon his right to
protect his interest against wrongful acts of others simply because he has
executed a lease of his property."32 The plaintiffs were allowed to recover
damages for loss of a pond, for fence posts, and for letting loose of cat-
tle. The plaintiff father recovered general damages as well.
While one should have no quarrel with an award of damages caused
by a seismic crew in the circumstances of the Lloyd case, it may be
preferable not to base the award on a theory of trespass. If the seismic
crew had been a contractor of the lessee performing services for the lessee,
could a claim have been brought on a trespass basis? Consent of the lessor
(beyond the right granted by the lease) would not be necessary in the
contractor situation, though a prudent lessee would seek such consent.
Damages should be recoverable, but the basis for them would be
negligence, not trespass.
In Hogan Exploration, Inc. v. Monroe Engineering Associates,33 the
plaintiff oil and gas operator recovered damages from an engineering firm
which caused the plaintiff to drill a well at an improper location because
the firm staked the well at the wrong place. Upon discovering the er-
roneous placement of the well, the plaintiff got leases and permission for
the location, but the well was unsuccessful. The plaintiff then drilled
another -well near the original location.
The court of appeal upheld the damage award, holding that the stak-
ing of a well site in the wrong quarter section, after admittedly being
provided with sufficient information to stake it at the correct location,
constitutes conduct so clearly improper and manifestly below reasonable
standards in the engineering profession as to render such action an excep-
tion to the general rule of proof of the degree of care and skill exercised
by other engineering professionals in the area. The activity constitutes con-
duct which ordinary reason and logic characterize as faulty and negligent.
The plaintiff did not waive or ratify the error by securing leases and com-
31. 430 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
32. Id. at 300.
33. 430 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
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pleting the well at the improper location; these were good faith efforts
to mitigate damages.
Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Parker34 may cause some prob-
lems for the future. A landowner and his drilling contractors commenced
two wells on his land, which was subject to a right of way in favor of
the plaintiff Southwestern Electric Power Co. (SWEPCO). The wells were
within fifty feet of the power lines of SWEPCO. The right of way from
the landowner's predecessor in title allowed SWEPCO to remove or pro-
hibit any obstructions within one hundred feet of the lines that might
interfere with the lines. SWEPCO sought to enjoin any further drilling
on the land in question. The trial court granted a restraining order prevent-
ing further drilling but allowing completion of the two wells.
The court of appeal amended the judgment to enjoin the defendants
from any violation of the right of way agreement by their operations.
The court reasoned that it would be unduly burdensome for the power
company to monitor constantly all 4000 miles of its lines to supervise
activities of one acting contrary to the deed.
It is notable that the court in SWEPCO made no reference to article
11 of the Mineral Code which provides for accommodation of conflicting
rights in land and minerals. While the right of way of the power com-
pany preceded the mineral activities and provided the power company with
the authority to exclude, nevertheless, it must be noted that the right of
way is only a servitude upon the land, not the ownership of the land.
A close review of the opinion leaves the impression that the court did
not believe an inquiry to try to accommodate the several uses of the land
would be appropriate. The result is to change the servitude on the land
from a use of the land for power lines to virtual ownership of the land,
i.e., power to exclude all other uses of the land. This is not a desirable
result if other uses of the same land could be accommodated by reasonable
efforts.
CONSERVATION PRACTICE
Three reported cases involving conservation practice were decided in
the last year." Jordan v. Sutton36 is the latest in a series of cases involv-
ing a gas storage facility.3 7 In the earlier litigation the court of appeal
34. 419 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
35. The reader should be aware that the views of the writer are not disinterested in
conservation regulation since he is, at the time of this writing, continuing to serve as Com-
missioner of Conservation and is the successor in litigation in two of the cases discussed.
The author also has had to rule on some of the same matters and to take positions on
matters related closely to the issues in litigation. For these reasons, the writer has avoided
critical comment.
36. 424 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
37. The background and earlier decisions are discussed in Martin, supra note 4, at 378-81.
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held that there was no express time limit on bringing suit against the Com-
missioner of Conservation under Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:12. 3s
However, the defense of laches was available. On remand the trial court
held that laches did apply and that the delay of more than a year by
plaintiff in bringing suit to challenge an order of the Commissioner barred
the claim. The present case is an appeal of that decision. The court of
appeal held:
[Tihe two elements necessary for defendant to establish that plain-
tiff was guilty of laches concerning finality of the order of the
Commissioner, namely unreasonable delay in filing a direct suit
against the Commissioner and harm that would be suffered by
defendant and [Southern Natural Gas, intervenor and operator
of the storage project] resulting from their actions occasioned by
the delay, are clearly present, and the trial judge correctly so
held.39
Nevertheless, the court of appeal went on to hold that other items of
relief were not barred by laches. These included the plaintiff's seeking
an order directing that tests be performed and that the Commissioner pro-
duce information and answer interrogatories.
Summers v. Sutton4" concerned a challenge to an order of the Com-
missioner of Conservation which revised the boundaries and reduced the
size of a drilling and ,production unit from 231.07 acres to 161.04 acres.
The original unit was established on February 4, 1981, but was revised
after the drilling of a second well within the confines of the original unit
established that some of the acreage was nonproductive. The revision was
accomplished through a public hearing on September 2, 1981, and order
issued on October 5, 1981.
Numerous issues challenging the validity of the revised order were
raised. These include the following, as summarized by the court of appeal:
(1) in failing to grant them the stay of execution of the ad-
ministrative order pending the final -determination of the litiga-
tion; (2) in failing to require that they be furnished with the com-
plete record of the administrative hearing; (3) in not finding that
the Commissioner 'had not followed the procedures of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act; (4) in failing to require the agency
to hold Inexco [lessee] to the burden of proving with reasonable
certainty that the proposed revision unit was necessary; (5) in fail-
ing to find that the Commissioner's order did not include find-
ings of fact, accompanied by an express statement of supporting
38. As noted earlier, LA. R.S. 30:12 has been amended to iprovide a 60-day time limit.
See supra text accompanying note 2.
39. 424 So. 2d at 312.
40. 428 So. 2d 1121 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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facts; (6) in failing to find that the Commissioner's order was
arbitrary and capricious; (7) in failing to find that the Commis-
sioner's order was manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; (8) in
finding that Inexco had established that the Db-3 Sand in M M
Summers # 5 had shaled out; and (9) in affirming the ad-
ministrative order in question. 4'
The court of appeal upheld the Commissioner of Conservation on each
of the issues. In particular, the court observed that while the court's review
is not limited to the determination of whether or not the order is sup-
ported by substantial evidence, the court is not empowered to substitute
its judgment for that of the Commissioner: "[T]he Commissioner's deci-
sion that has a rational basis in the administrative record should be
upheld."" 2 The court held that there was a rational basis, and that the
Commissioner was not arbitrary and capricious in accepting the testimony
of the expert witnesses.
In Trahan v. Superior Oil Co., "3 the lessors sued their lessee and
others, complaining that their lease lands were drained by a well of their
lessee, the "Greene" well (completed as a producer in November 1976),
which was in a unit created by the Commissioner of Conservation in an
order of January 17, 1977, issued after application of Superior Oil Co;
(Superior). A subsequent order of May 1, 1978, effective March 14, 1978,
included a portion of the lessor's land in the unit for the "Greene" well.
The complaint for drainage was for the period of November 1976 through
March 1978. The basis for the claim was that the lessee breached its obliga-
tion to protect against drainage by failing to present data and informa-
tion showing drainage to the Commissioner in the hearing which led to
the order of January 1977, and in a hearing continuing the same unit
but adding an alternate unit well in January 1978. There was no express
allegation of fraud, lack of good faith, or intentional deception.
The trial court granted the defendant Superior's motion to dismiss,
holding that the suit was an impermissible collateral attack on an order
of the Commissioner of Conservation. On appeal, the federal Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed in an opinion that contains a full discus-
sion of the collateral attack rule in Louisiana law. A portion of that opin-
ion bears quoting here:
[T]he collateral attack rule does not focus on the duty of the
lessee, but rather on the order of the Commissioner. The col-
lateral attack doctrine does not come into play unless there is an
actual order of the Commissioner which in fact deals with the
41. Id. at 1125.
42. Id. at 1129.
43. 700 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1983).
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particular subject matter at issue (e.g., the appropriate unit for
a given well), and the order has not been determined, either ad-
ministratively or by suit under LSA-R.S. 30:12, to have been
improper when issued. The collateral attack rule simply says that
it generally may not be established that that particular order would
have made provisions in respect to the subject matter it dealt with
different from those it in fact made, had the lessee presented dif-
ferent evidence or requested a different result at the hearing. The
rule does not address the lessee's duty to cause a particular sub-
ject matter to be before the Commissioner for his action thereon;
and where the matter does not come before the Commissioner,
then the collateral attack rule is inoperative and does not pro-
hibit the lessor from showing that if the matter had been brought
before the Commissioner he would probably have acted on it and
have done so with a particular result. But where the matter does
come before the Commissioner and he does act on it, then the
collateral attack rule generally precludes the lessor from asserting
that that particular action would have been different had the lessee
conducted itself differently at the hearing leading to the action.""
Applying this rule to the present matter, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
an exception to the rule was not appropriate and affirmed the judgment
below.
44. Id. at 1020-21.
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